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Financial accounting necessarily depends on an entity assumption which shapes the 
way it recognises and accounts for organizational exchanges with social 
environments.  It thereby constructs boundaries and frames permeability in terms of 
what counts, is accounted for, as being inside and outside of the organization.  Yet 
there are different possible entity concepts reflecting different values about the 
relationship between the organizational entity and society.  This essay considers four 
problem areas in which these values and the entity-society relationship are at stake 
within financial accounting: the problem of control within group accounting; 
accounting for externalities; the economization of public organizations; and the 
construction of organizational actorhood.  These four problematics suggest that 
financial accounting, its boundary determining assumptions and the forms of 
organizational permeability it permits, are deeply intertwined and subject to 
continuous pressure for change.  
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Organizations are embedded in society in multiple ways.  Institutional theories show 
how society flows into, shapes and is itself shaped by organizations, so much so that it 
is trivial to assert that organizations are social entities.  Yet organizations are 
characterised by multiple boundaries which, though also social and institutional in 
nature, seek to separate organizations from, and control exchanges with, their 
environments.  In short, boundaries have a dis-embedding effect in limiting and 
shaping how society ‘gets in’.  Such boundaries are necessarily fictions, but they are 
fictions which underpin the institutionalization of organizations as relatively discrete 
entities which interact with each other and which transact with their environments.   
These institutional conditions of boundedness and closure constitute, and are 
intertwined with, the kinds of openness and permeability that define organizations.   
 
The law has played an important historical role in entity construction, moving beyond 
organizational collectives which remain fundamentally grounded in their human 
members, to create non-human entities capable of contracting in their own name, of 
becoming responsible actors in their own right, and of owning property.  Yet these 
legally constituted entities and their constituted autonomy may be only be loosely 
coupled to other less formalised boundaries and modes of permeability based more on 
relationships and alliances, and on the enduring importance of human networks.  
Thus, there is no necessary alignment between formal organizational boundaries and  
organizing understood as an on-going process.  Where an organization begins and 
ends may also be relative to the institutional (and theoretical) optic employed and for 




what purpose.  Indeed, the question of organizational boundaries and permeability is 
not only technical in nature; it raises issues of value: what are organizations for and 
who do they serve? And from this viewpoint it follows that boundary-permeability 
configurations may be multiple and contested. 
 
In this essay, we consider how financial accounting is deeply implicated in this 
construction of organizational boundaries and its controversies.  Specifically, we 
explore how accounting both defines and mediates the boundary between inside and 
outside in the broad sense of the relation between organizations and their 
environments, or what we shall call ‘entity’ and ‘society’, yet it is also subject to 
pressures to change that boundary.  In short, financial accounting must manage a 
continuous tension between ‘keeping society out’, but not too much in order to be 
responsive, and bringing society back in, but not too much in order to maintain entity 
coherence. 
 
Financial accounting consists of core technical components:  income statements; 
balance sheets; cash flow statements; and supporting explanatory notes.  Although 
this data can exist in multiple forms, the core financial statements are conventionally 
published in the form of an annual report.  The latter normally also contains a broader 
narrative providing the wider context of the organization and other metrics, often of a 
non-financial nature.  Financial accounting is commonly understood and taught as a 
set of procedures and techniques for making organizations more transparent, and 
thereby making its leaders accountable to specific outsiders.  It is claimed that 
financial accounting for companies enables their actual and potential shareholders to 
make better decisions about capital allocation because vital information about costs, 




income, assets and debt is disclosed to them.  According to this myth of transparency 
(Christensen & Cornelissen, 2015), financial accounting can be viewed as a window 
between the ‘inner’ operational world of the organization and its outside.   The 
window may not always function as the external world would like – there may be 
fraud or the accounting rules may be imperfect, but accounting is conceptualised 
primarily as a neutral relay, which merely ‘intermediates’ (Latour, 2005) between 
organizations and their environments.  It is conduit or membrane for information to 
flow between organizations and their institutional environments, thereby managing 
and reducing uncertainty (Meyer, 1986).  Importantly, this intermediating model of 
accounting assumes that it is a practice which is somehow independent of the 
accounted-for organization, an assumption which the remainder of this essay will 
challenge.   
 
Modern financial accounting practice is relatively young, designed approximately 150 
years ago for an industrial age in which the largest organizations essentially took the 
tangible form of factories and plants.  The boundaries of the organization could often 
be thought of in physical terms: supplies arrive at a factory gate, are converted into 
valuable outputs and then physically leave when sold.  As is well known, the factory 
as a physical organizational form solved the coordination issues associated with loose 
networks of dispersed sub-contracted production sites, and forms of accounting and 
bookkeeping were designed to control not only  flows of goods into, within, and out 
of the factory as an accounting entity, but also flows of people. 
 
Residues of this physicalist/manufacturist conception of organization, which can be 
found in classical organizational sociology of Weber and others, are still to be found 




in the structures of modern financial accounting.  Indeed, financial accounting 
continues to be challenged by conceptual and measurement difficulties in dealing with 
the rise of the intangible economy and in representing more fluid and hybrid 
organizational forms which are increasingly prevalent in the twenty first century.  
Such developments have made organizational boundaries problematic and fuzzy, and 
readers of formal accounts must turn to disclosures about so-called ‘related parties’ to 
get a preliminary sense of the networks which span these boundaries.  
 
These developments, which are well documented in accounting and management 
scholarship, reveal that a clearly bounded entity, even if organizationally non-
descriptive, is a condition of possibility of financial accounting.  For modern financial 
accounting to work it must define what is inside an entity, what is outside of the 
entity, and what passes between the two as a trans-action.   This means that financial 
accounting does not only represent organizations, it performs them as specific and 
formal accounting entities according to a logic which may or may not be well-aligned 
with their operating reality.   
 
In the remainder of this paper, we explore several aspects of this boundary-
constituting function of accounting in more depth, and the tensions that pervade it.   
We begin by discussing the centrality of the so-called ‘entity assumption’ to 
accounting and argue that this assumption reflects deeply institutionalized values 
about ownership and rights to exercise control. Yet this accounting boundary 
construction is also a society-entity interface which is essentially dissonant and never 
settled or free from controversy. How does financial accounting manage and represent 
the value-laden relationship between organizations and changing societal-level issues?  




To answer this question the essay considers four different but related problematics of 
accounting boundary-making.   First, the technical setting of accounting for groups as 
‘meta-entities’ is discussed, focusing on the problem of defining the boundary of a 
group in terms of managerial control.  Second, we develop a more critical reading of 
accounting boundaries and argue that they are a site for an environmental politics 
focused on the reinternalization of externalized costs, such as pollution.  Third, we 
invert the internalization problematic and show how, under specific circumstances, 
accounting functions to economize public organizations as entities capable of 
succeeding and failing irrespective of their external costs and benefits.  Fourth, we 
consider how financial accounting is implicated in the construction of organizations 
as purposeful and responsible actors, making them both highly rationalised but also 
vulnerable and permeable to the expectations and risks posed by society in the form of 
stakeholders.    These four problematics suggest that boundary-making and 
organizational permeability are deeply intertwined issues, that they are dynamic and a 
source of continuous change, and that accounting should be at the heart of any 
discussion of them. 
 
THE ACCOUNTING ENTITY ASSUMPTION: PROPRIETORIAL OR 
SOCIAL? 
 
Early in their studies, new accounting students are taught that the entity concept is the 
one of the most fundamental, determining what is included as a matter of account and 
what is not (Weetman, 2011, chapter 1).  A clear definition of the accounting entity is 
a condition of possibility for doing any financial accounting at all, since it determines 
which transactions are to be accounted for as part of the entity and which not.  As we 




shall see, this is no trivial matter and yet, as they become increasingly technically 
proficient, and socialized into the accounting view of the world, the significance of 
this assumption and the dependency of accounting on it recedes from students’ view.  
The accounting entity has become more or less naturalised and institutionalised.   
However, when technical and practical accounting problems arise, they reveal that 
accounting and organization and not identical and this inevitably brings the 
accounting entity assumption back to the surface of discussion, not least because it is 
not a single and unequivocal concept:   
 
 ‘The entity is variously regarded as a proprietary unit, an economic unit, a managerial 
unit, a social unit, and a collection of rights and restrictions on their exercise’ (Meyer, 
1973, p.116) 
 
Thus, an accounting entity concept which emphasises the rights of specific owners 
reflects the traditional proprietary view of the accounting entity i.e. that the firm is 
simply an instrument for owners who have claims over the net assets of the 
organization to increase their personal wealth.  The accounting must reflect that 
relationship.  A small family company might be a good example where this 
proprietary idea makes sense, but even the proprietary approach can vary in its 
respective definitions of ‘owners’.   Indeed, the very notion of an ‘owner’ is itself not 
unproblematic.  For example, in the case of a company equity shareholders only own 
shares which are rights over net assets: they do not legally own those net assets 
directly (the corporate legal entity does).  This suggests that the proprietorial 
accounting entity concept is itself nested in a web of legal precepts (Biondi et al., 




2008) pointing to an intimate conceptual relationship between law and financial 
accounting (Freedman & Power, 1991). 
 
In contrast to the proprietorial idea, the pure entity concept of the accounting entity 
posits the organization not just as an instrument for, and extension of, its owners, but 
as something more discrete in itself with multiple possible purposes.  From this point 
of view, the accounting entity is more of an autonomous institution – an actor in its 
own right - with a stronger boundary than the proprietary concept between itself and 
owners like shareholders, who are remote providers of capital.  This accounting 
concept seems to be more aligned with the economic and managerial reality of the 
large public corporation which pursues its purposes, subject to being accountable to 
creditors and shareholders as outside claimants on the net assets which are in effect 
controlled by the entity.  The law relating to corporate personality provides 
conceptual support for this more autonomous entity concept (Ireland, 1996).  
Furthermore, as we shall see below, organizational sociology has built on this idea yet 
further to understand formal organizations culturally as discrete rational actors in their 
own right (Jeppersen & Meyer, 2011). 
 
An important conceptual variant of the pure entity view of the accounting entity is the 
so-called social entity concept which focuses on: ‘the role of the business enterprise in 
satisfying the many demands of society including those of employers, creditors, 
lessors, stockholders, customers, suppliers and the community at large’ (Meyer, 
1973).  From this point of view, the accounting entity is still an instrument, but it is an 
instrument for social purposes whatever they may be, such as in the case of a 
cooperative or a mutual organization which exits for the benefit and security of its 




members.  Strictly speaking the ‘social’ accounting entity owns no assets and enjoys 
no income – it is simply a vehicle with a ‘license’ for pursuing specific social goals.    
 
These different accounting entity concepts are cultural forms and have emerged in 
specific historical settings.  They are specific but largely invisible institutional design 
choices about which aspects of organizational activity and economic relationships are 
to be accounted for, and which not. Furthermore, they rarely exist in their pure form.  
Elements of both proprietorial and pure entity concepts are embedded in the legal 
frameworks in different jurisdictions and reflect tensions about what to account for 
and to whom.  Indeed, despite their apparent institutional stability and invisibility, the 
different nuances of the accounting entity concept suggest that it is not coherent or 
consistent foundation for accounting and from time this becomes visible and are a 
source of fierce debate and controversy.   
 
For example, in the United Kingdom in the early part of the twenty first century a 
fundamental review of company law took place (DTI, 2001).  A key question at stake 
was how and whether to base the design of company law on a relatively more 
proprietorial view or a relatively more social view of the enterprise.  In the end, 
supported by arguments of efficiency and operability, the proprietorial view and the 
primacy of the equity shareholder prevailed. However, there was an important 
concession to the social entity view in the form of the Companies Act 2006 section 
172.  This section places a duty on company directors to promote the success of the 
company “for the benefit of its members as a whole”.  In doing this, a director must 
have regard for inter alia: the interests of the company's employees; the need to foster 
the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; and the 




impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment.  In effect, 
the proprietorial and social entity views were combined, but with a clear priority for 
the former. 
 
Another period of what might be called ‘accounting entity’ controversy was visible in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2009 in the United Kingdom.  Banks had 
accounted for themselves as autonomous actors in the normal way as proprietorial-
entity hybrids.  As these banks failed and required taxpayer funding for their 
continued existence, it became evident that citizens as taxpayers, rather than 
shareholders, were the banks’ real and hitherto invisible proprietors and risk-bearers 
of last resort.  Banks became permeable to societal level concerns and many argued 
that banking organizations should be reconceptualised and accounted for, at least as 
regards their retail banking operations, as utilities with a public purpose i.e. as social 
entities.  There followed a period of much discussion focused on the question ‘what 
are banks for?’ (e.g. Gobat, 2012).  And yet, despite this very public problematization 
of banks as organizations, the underlying entity concept of banks and their accounting 
did not change.   
 
In other settings, the tension between proprietorial and social entity accounting 
concepts is more visible and continuous.  For example, in the case of organizations 
with an explicit public purpose, such as universities and museums, different entity 
concepts live uneasily with one another and continuously raise the question of 
purpose.  In the museum setting, different entity concepts underpin different ways to 
account for so-called ‘heritage assets’.  When the museum is regarded as an 
autonomous entity, they are assets of the entity and appear on the asset side of the 




balance sheet.  However, a blend of proprietorial and social entity concepts would 
position heritage assets as assets of society, held in trust by the museum organization 
for society and future generations.  Indeed, one might even regard them as liabilities 
of the organization because they are lent by their owner – society.  In effect, heritage 
assets would be assets on the balance sheet of society, were such a thing to exist, and 
liabilities of the museum.  In practice, they are represented and accounted for as assets 
in the traditional way (Barton, 2005), but this is more a matter of pragmatism and the 
difficulties of operationalising the social entity view, rather than any underlying 
conceptual coherence.  It means that accounting for organizations like museums is 
essentially dissonant.  This dissonance or entity pluralism is ‘managed’ within the 
narrative of public disclosure documents, such as an annual report, largely by 
avoiding it.  Thus museums, universities and other social purpose organizations will 
separate the financial accounts from other aspects of the annual report which deal 
with the achievement of social purposes and which try to measure and account for 
social impact. 
    
In summary, accounting ‘entity’ constructs seem to be merely conceptual assumptions 
but they are much more than that.  As historically emergent norms, they are bearers of 
competing values and conceptions of the enterprise, and are therefore in principle 
political in nature.  The proprietorial, pure entity and social entity concepts can be 
understood as different values underlying different possible accounting 
representations of the boundaries of organization.  The proprietorial view positions 
the organization as an extension of its owners, whereas the entity view sees it as more 
autonomous and self-directing.  The social entity view seeks to reflect and account for 
the social purpose of the organization.   





These are three different ways of conceptualising and configuring the organization 
and its boundaries according to an accounting logic i.e. for deciding what is to be 
accounted for as part of an organization and therefore visible, and what is not. 
Accounting entity concepts, and therefore financial accounting, are institutional 
fictions which represent and repeatedly perform the boundaries of the organization in 
their own way.  They define specific forms of accounting closure which determine the 
kind of openness and permeability that they permit.  Yet, as we shall see, they are also 
continuously problematic and contentious.  In what follows we consider four 
problematics or themes in which these accounting entity concepts are implicated in 
the representation of organizational boundaries.   We begin with the seemingly 
technical problem of group accounting.    
 
BOUNDARIES OF CONTROL: WHAT IS A GROUP?   
 
One of the technical accounting areas where the entity debate is more than theoretical 
is that of ‘group’ accounting.  The group as an organization is an economic ‘meta-
entity’ over and above the individual legally constituted economic entities which 
comprise that group.  How can this meta-entity be represented by accounting? The 
problem is analogous but not identical to the notion of the meta-organization (Ahrne 
& Brunnson, 2008) as an organizational form whose members are other organizations.  
The boundary issue is how to determine the limits of membership.  In the case of 
meta-organizations such as trade associations, the boundary between a member and 
non-member is relatively clear.  In the case of the boundaries of a group, it is 




necessary to determine which entities are ‘inside’ it and how they should be 
represented.  This is not always simple. 
 
Conceptually, accounting for a group boils down to the boundaries of management 
control.  Entities are accounted for within a group where there is evidence that they 
are controlled by group management as a central directing agency.   Control can be 
understood as a form of organizational permeability.  That is, where an organization is 
said to control another, the controlled organization is permeable to its influence.   But 
what is control?  
 
Control is conventionally indicated for accounting purposes in terms of the percentage 
of equity owned by an investing company.  Once control as defined by equity 
shareholding is known, the accountant is able to define the residual non-controlling 
interest in a group of companies. The historical presumption is that ownership of 
greater than 50% of equity confers control and in this case the owned entity must be 
included in the group. In technical terms this usually means that all of the net assets of 
the entity are under the control of the group and there is a minority or non-controlling 
interest for the remaining percentage of shares held externally.  However, even this is 
not as clear cut as it seems. 
 
Equity ownership is a proxy for the kind of control that can be exercised by an 
investing company.  Thus, if a company owns 20% or less than the equity, it is 
normally deemed not to have control and therefore simply accounts for its ownership 
interest as an investment at fair value.  If the parent owns between 20% and 50 % of 
the equity, it is presumed to have a significant influence but not a controlling interest 




over the investment, and therefore adopts what accountants call the ‘equity method’ 
which includes a proportionate share of the net assets of the investee company in its 
group accounts.  Finally, if the parent owns in excess of 50% of the equity, there is a 
presumption of control and it adopts the consolidated method.  However, over time 
several possible accounting methods for consolidation have competed for institutional 
favour.  The technical differences depend in part on the underlying entity concept 
adopted.  For example, a proprietorial entity assumption would include all the assets 
and liabilities of the investee company at fair value, a number for goodwill to reflect 
the excess paid over that fair value of net assets, and a single line number to reflect 
the non-controlling interest, i.e. the claims of the non-controlling shareholders on the 
net assets of the subsidiary.   
 
Stepping back from these technical accounting details, we need to ask what it is that 
accounting rule-makers are trying to represent about the substantive economic 
relationship between an investing company and its investee company.  For example, 
an acquiring company may pay a premium to invest in another because of anticipated 
synergies with the new business, and this premium is reflected in the ‘goodwill’ 
number.   However, if A owns 51% percent of B are there really these kind of real 
synergies with all 100% of B?  How much more credible are the claims about future 
synergies if A owns  95% of B?  And if A owns 51% of B but A and B are in 
somewhat unrelated industries and will continue to operate fairly independently, the 
synergies seem less likely. So what does any premium paid for control, if that exists, 
really reflect?  Perhaps there is some anticipated knowledge transfer or new 
managerial capability?  Ultimately, how might companies represent (or hide) that a 




51% ownership stake is tenuous (because for example of internal management 
fighting?) and that the 49% “minority interest” is rock solid? 
 
Thus, once one looks below the equity ownership proxy for control into the economic 
and managerial substance, the concept of control is more problematic and the 
boundaries of the group - which entities are in and which are out - are more 
indeterminate than accounting rules suggest.  Furthermore, a tension emerges between 
the accounting representation of a meta-entity like a group, and other concepts of 
organization which may be based on more intangible factors such as relationships.  
Group accounting practice aspires to represent the underlying economic reality of 
these relationships in terms of entities under the control of a central, investing entity, 
with external interests as some kind of residual claim over the net assets of the 
subsidiary company.  But the concept of control, on which this aspiration depends, is 
not strictly binary.  There can also be forms of influence or the lack of it which do not 
correlate with shareholdings.  For example, it is well known that powerful retailers 
with significant purchasing power can exert significant influence over the actions of 
smaller entities which supply it, without any equity interest being at stake.  This 
means that determination of group boundaries in terms of control are always 
contestable when the real issue is the economic and managerial substance of the 
relationships between economic entities.  These relationships may or may not involve 
equity interests as we commonly understand them.  
 
All this means that the accounting ‘group’ is a very imperfect representation, at best 
an approximation, of the meta-organization and the boundaries of control and 
influence of a guiding managerial centre.  And yet group accounting also to some 




degree performs that meta-organization as a coherent actor.  Group accounting as an 
institutionalised practice operates as if control is correlated with patterns of 
ownership.  But in a world of joint ventures, supply chain management, strategic 
alliances and other network organizational forms which blur boundaries, the fiction of 
control with sharp distinctions is hard to sustain.  Furthermore, social entity issues are 
at stake in group accounting.  We know that accounting rules for group boundaries 
can be exploited – famously in the case of Enron (Benston & Hartgreaves, 2002).  
‘Special purpose vehicles’ (SPVs) were used in this case as ‘fake’ accounting entities 
designed explicitly to fall below the consolidation threshold, and outside of formally 
defined control ratios, in order to hold debt and other risky assets.  From a group point 
of view, such risks were literally invisible to investors as they were ‘off balance 
sheet’.   
 
Furthermore, as the collapse of Lehman brothers showed so clearly, under conditions 
of stress, an accounting group falls apart into its constituent legal entities with their 
own assets and liabilities, which may end up in different jurisdictions to the 
disappointment of creditors.  Insolvency therefore restores the fictional status of the 
group meta-entity and the proprietorial interest of creditors dominates the construction 
of the stressed or failing individual accounting entities.  Indeed, the process of 
insolvency could be said to resolve the tension between accounting and organization.  
Under conditions of insolvency, organizations are reduced to a balance sheet of, 
usually problematic, assets and claims over them. 
 
Groups are a very technical area of financial accounting and the analysis provided 
above is simplified.  Yet this is an instructive case setting to begin our exploration of 




the tension between accounting and organizations.  As noted earlier, the institutional 
fiction is that accounting represents an entity – an organization or group of 
organizations – which is independent of the accounting itself.  From this point of view 
accounting is assumed to be a neutral ‘intermediary’ in Latour’s (2005) sense which 
simply reveals the economic reality of the organization and makes it visible and 
‘readable’ to others.  And indeed, for many groups which contain only 100% owned 
subsidiaries under tight central management control, this is how the accounting seems 
to work.   
 
Yet the problems of defining control noted above, also reveal that accounting is not 
this neutral window on an economic group.  It is difficult for accounting to deal with 
relationships of influence and control which are not correlated with ownership 
patterns and the core accounting statements are only coherent where there are clean 
entity boundaries.  This means that accounting embodies decisions and rules which 
seek clean technical boundaries when such clarity and unequivocality is impossible.    
Furthermore, the ‘group’ is itself an actively constructed accounting fiction in the face 
of other ways of thinking of collective entities.  And, for all its technical problems, 
this accounting fiction is also ‘ontologically performative’ (Butler, 2010) in that it 
repeatedly brings about the institutional reality of the group as a meta-entity.  This 
ontological achievement by group accounting is twofold.  First it fixes the 
boundedness of a group as an entity.  Second, and relatedly, it constitutes the fiction 
of the central controlling proprietorial investor-actor.  By accounting fiction, we do 
not mean that groups do not exist.  On the contrary, as we develop further below, we 
are institutionally compelled to act as if groups are real and in accounting for them we 
make them real.   





CRITICAL ACCOUNTING: ‘BRINGING SOCIETY BACK IN’ 
 
The discussion so far suggests that financial accounting does not simply ‘mirror’ the 
difference between the inside and the outside of the organization.  It is a technology 
for seeing and constructing that difference, and thereby organizations and their formal 
boundaries.  The shaping of these boundaries, also determines ‘what counts’ as an 
exchange across it them i.e.the formal permeability in accounting terms between the 
inside and outside of an organization.  In short, organizational permeability and 
accounting boundary construction may not be identical as we shall see, but they are 
deeply related to each other. 
 
Notwithstanding the conceptual plurality of entity concepts and accounting 
boundaries, the institutionally predominant form for large organizations is the pure 
entity concept which treats organizations as if they are discrete actors separate from 
the environment, including the owners and creditors to whom they owe duties in law.   
In short, modern financial accounting practice embodies and reinforces a form of 
organizational individualism and separatism.  Furthermore, this entity concept is 
descriptive because organizations also perform the very individualism and autonomy 
which is embedded in the underlying entity concept.   
 
Yet, this particular mode of accounting boundary construction accounting is 
sometimes rendered problematic and challenged, as it was in the immediate aftermath 
of the financial crisis noted above.   If only briefly, via their systemic properties banks 
became visible discussed as ‘social entities’.  Indeed, the system of banking was 




revealed under stress not as a collection of interacting individual autonomous entities 
but as an important public utility, a social meta-entity which could not be allowed to 
fail.  The banking system came to understood, too late of course, rather like a meta-
group defined not by managerial or regulatory control but by the risky 
interconnections between the balance sheets of individual banks in the group.  
Prevailing forms of accounting and enterprise risk management failed because their 
shared entity assumptions and fictional form of boundedness rendered them and their 
regulators intellectually unable to account for the space and relations between these 
entities, spaces where the risk of interconnectedness incubated until they were 
triggered by the loss of liquidity in the interbank market (Power, 2009).  Banking 
organizations became suddenly permeable to risks which were incapable of 
recognition in the prevailing financial accounting, auditing, credit rating and 
regulatory system. 
 
In a different context, Hines (1988) analyses this general problem of ‘recognition’ and 
uses the device of the master and pupil to explore and problematise the boundary-
creating properties of accounting.  At the beginning of the paper, the master points to 
a factory and asks the pupil what an organization is - in the sense of what is and is not 
part of it?  Accounting, we and the pupil are told, is active in deciding this question, in 
determining what is and is not in the organization.  Financial accounting is, far from 
being natural and self-evident, a collective choice about the boundaries of the 
organization.  Accounting elements such as the ‘assets’ of the organization are made 
real via techniques for their ‘recognition’.  The production of surplus or profit by the 
organization is made real by the ‘realization’ of the income and expenses of the 
organization.  In respect of the latter, accounting chooses what does and does not 




permeate the organization as a legitimate ‘expense’, such as environmental 
degradation from factory pollution. Indeed, following Hines, systemic risk in the 
banking sector can be imagined as a kind of pollution which the large banking 
‘factories’ produced and externalised, and which was invisible in the prevailing 
accounting and risk system - until it became too great to contain and overflowed the 
limits of these systems. 
 
Because contemporary accounting and its entity logics are highly institutionalised, 
they are hard to challenge and this gives financial accounting as it is now practiced an 
almost invisible power: “we [accountants]create a picture of an organization…and on 
the basis of that picture….people think and act.  And by responding to that picture of 
reality, they make it so” (Hines, 1988, p. 257).  In other words, accounting constructs 
a picture of organizational reality which is institutionally demanded and reinforces 
actions in the name of that reality.  Even seemingly technical financial accounting 
controversies, like the problem of group accounting discussed above, can also be read 
as fundamental controversies about nature of the enterprise and its boundaries.   
 
For Hines, in traditional accounting all inputs to an enterprise must have a ‘cost’.  
This means that externalized, unaccounted-for pollution can only become an 
accounting cost if a liability is created for it, that is if the external event of pollution 
can be made internal to the organization.  Or, in other words, the boundary of the 
organization must be shifted to recognise the pollution.  However, from Hines’ point 
of view, accounting and accountants are not themselves the key agents of this 
boundary construction.  They simply reflect and reproduce, and do not challenge, the 
institutionalised ontology of the organization.  This means that the entity concepts 




discussed above are themselves the result of accumulated social choice and 
accounting simply reproduces this choice.  For this reason, Hines argues, somewhat 
against the more constructivist reading developed earlier, that cultural and 
institutional change can only come before accounting change, that is: “when people 
see ‘pollution’ as part of the organization’ (p.255).     
 
Financial accounting and the corporate report in which it is embedded are never static 
There are many examples of financial accounting changing to accommodate new 
concerns and values created elsewhere, for example in responding to new 
environmental and social liabilities for organizations created by the law.  There are 
also many disclosures that companies now make, under the general heading of 
‘corporate social responsibility’, that lean towards a social entity accounting concept.  
Yet, critical accountants like Hines, are doubtful that these initiatives have really 
changed the dominant accounting picture of the organization and its boundaries.  Over 
time, financial accounting has been receptive and creative in the face of social 
pressures for more representation of the social exterior, provided that these 
internalised accounting elements have a degree of measurability and auditability.  
However, Hines reminds us that there is a big difference between making an existing 
organizational boundary more permeable to its environment and recognising in 
accounting terms a wider range of possible effects of its activities, and changing the 
entity concept itself.  The latter would require a major conceptual and institutional 
shift in the underlying concept of the entity, and this would require the creation of a 
new institutional reality of the kind that the UK company law review in the early 
2000s decided not to embrace.   
 




In summary, efforts to make accounting recognise and internalise social costs and 
effects reveal how the boundedness of the organization as enacted by an accounting 
system is a deeply embedded societal value choice.  Despite extensive critique and 
pressures to bring more of society into financial accounting, and even some success at 
the edges in doing this, the dominant accounting entity concept itself is largely 
unchanged and de-politicised, not least for public organizations with explicit social 
purposes, such as charities, whose financial accounts strongly resemble those of 
private companies.  For Hines and others like her, this shows that financial accounting 
and its entity assumptions serve a hegemonic purpose in supporting the ‘interests of 
capital’ and that other values and other forms of social organization would result in 
different accountings for different costs by different kinds of entity.  Indeed, efforts to 
bring more of society into the realm of financial accounting have failed to shift the 
dominant entity concept.  This reveals how financial accounting is also active in 
keeping society out as we now consider. 
 
KEEPING SOCIETY OUT: ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMIZATION 
 
The discussion so far has explored the role of financial accounting in shaping and 
reproducing the organizational boundaries of organizations as entities with a primary 
economic purpose.   Here, as discussed in the previous section, the policy problem 
implicit in Hines’ (1988) analysis has been one of accounting (and the law) making 
such organizations more permeable to non-economic values or at least, in the case of 
sustainability, to ‘longer term’ conceptions of the economic which align with other 
social values.  But in the setting of public and not-for-profit sectors, where 
organizations are not primarily driven by economic values and exist for one or more 




social purposes, the role of accounting has been the very opposite of bringing society 
back in.   Rather, than making accounting more receptive to socially significant 
externalities, accounting in this setting is used as an instrument to make public 
organizations more economically purposeful.  In short, accounting has been actively 
deployed as a change agent to construct organizations as economic entities and to re-
define their boundaries in such terms.   
 
This change process has been at the heart of the heart of neoliberal reforms to public 
administration in many countries over the last three decades – the so-called ‘new 
public management’ (Hood, 1995).  Such reforms have been multi-faceted and 
complex but in essence have promoted private and market sector governance 
disciplines in the different fields of public sector service provision.  Thus, there has 
been a growth of devices like outsourcing and contracting, outright privatisation, and 
risk-sharing via public private partnerships (Froud, 2003; Roberts, 2011).  
Furthermore, public sector workers have been subject to more stringent definitions 
and monitoring of performance in the name of key reform values, such as improved 
efficiency. 
 
As an example of these changes, Kurunmäki’s (1999) study of reforms to the Finnish 
medical system in the 1980s shows how there was a transition from an administrative 
to a more managerial culture premised on critiques of waste and inefficiency.  The 
result was a shift from a centralised resource allocation model to a market-based 
system of allocation of finance via explicit contracts.  This in turn required the 
development and transplantation of private sector tools of performance measurement 
to assess the performance of medical professionals.  Financial accounting was deeply 




implicated in this reform process, which involved the expansion of private sector style 
financial controls into areas where they had been previously absent.  As in other parts 
of the public sector, the policy aspiration was that better accounting for the costs of 
medical treatment would allow political and public decision makers to use financial 
accounting to evaluate the financial strength of ‘units’ and ‘sub-units’ such as 
hospitals and their departments. 
 
While these changes brought new possibilities for monitoring and evaluating 
performance they also created a ‘potential discrepancy between…political decision 
makers and…medical professionals concerning the definition of an appropriate 
accounting entity in the health care field.’ (Kurunmäki, 1999, p. 225).  Medical 
professionals took a broader view of their accountability – it was to society at large in 
the form of patients rather than to the hospital as an autonomous economic entity.  
Specifically, there was an observed ‘contradiction between idea of the hospital as an 
accounting entity, and the perception of a society-wide accountability’ (p.227).  
Physicians and policy narratives were more focused in a general sense on the external 
benefits arising beyond the boundaries of the hospital as a constituted entity.  Medical 
professionals in Kurunmäki’s analysis operated intuitively with a ‘social entity’ 
(Meyer, 1973) assumption about the hospital, and assumed connections between their 
interventions and social welfare more generally, even though these benefits could in 
many cases be measured only imperfectly.   Their sense of the organizational 
boundary and of the reach of their responsibilities, was much wider than the 
organization as an economic entity.   
 




Yet despite this professional narrative, claimed external social benefits were too 
vague to qualify for recognition in financial accounts.  Permeability in financial 
accounting necessarily simplifies and reduces externalities to their measurable and 
and auditable proxies.  Furthermore, the expanded significance accorded to the new 
emphasis on financial accounting and its implicit entity concept became self-
fulfilling.  Accounting was powerful not only in recording the hospital as an economic 
entity but also in performing it by bringing new organizational routines into being to 
reinforce it over time.  Kurunmäki shows that despite being initially disputed, the new 
accounting led progressively to a ‘refocusing of attention of medical professionals’ 
(p.230) resulting in changes to patient treatment practices and a new consciousness of 
costs to the economic entity.  Hospitals as economic entities became permeated by 
economic reasoning of a specific kind, facilitated by accounting, which displaced 
older frameworks of public health economics.  As a side-effect of this shift, the period 
of change also saw the emergence of gaming strategies by hospitals seeking to 
maximise their performance in terms of various new accounting indicators (e.g. 
Bevan & Hood, 2006).  
 
Like Hines, Kurunmäki argues that the way that accounting made hospitals and 
clinical departments into entities is ‘deeply embedded in attempts to reconfigure fields 
of power.’ (See also Arnold & Oakes, 1995).  The deployment and expansion of 
financial accounting, and its underlying entity concept, is a form of territorialisation, 
namely the creation of spaces for economic calculation which demarcate and separate 
such spaces into discrete entities from one another and from their environments 
(Miller & Power, 2013).  The power of accounting consists not only in defining the 
boundaries of discrete entities but also in shaping humans and organizations as actors 




focused on a defined form of performance within a specific space or territory (Miller, 
1992).  
 
One further important consequence of the deployment of accounting to construct 
organizations as economic entities is that their success and failure also become 
articulated primarily in accounting terms.  Notions of solvency and financial health 
indicated by various ratios are only possible if there is a balance sheet which is, in 
turn, only possible when forms of ‘accrual’ accounting are introduced (Miller& 
Power, 1995; Kurunmäki & Miller, 2013).  But once created, it is logically and 
empirically possible that such entities can be described as failing or can ‘fail’ as 
entities, even though the unmeasured and unaccounted social benefits of their 
activities may, in a realist sense, greatly ‘outweigh’ the costs associated with the 
entity.  For this reason, failure may not have the ‘reality’ that is usually attributed to it 
(Kurunmäki, Mennicken & Miller, in press).  Equally, as the case of a Mid-
Staffordshire National Health service Trust in the UK demonstrated, organizations 
can be succeeding in accounting terms when they are failing in underlying patient 
care (Francis, 2013).   
 
The role of financial accounting in economic entity construction has been explored in 
other contexts, including prisons (e.g. Mennicken, 2013) and Museums (e.g. Barton, 
2005), which are organizations whose historical purpose is grounded in bringing 
about social changes and benefits beyond the ‘walls’ of the organization.  These 
settings are characterised by numerous performance indicators, some of which are 
intended to bring ‘society back in’ and capture valued externalities, thereby 
compensating for the financial accounting entity view of the organization.  In the 




setting of prisons, reoffending rates have come to be important non-financial 
measures. In the case of museums, school outreach measures and visitor numbers seek 
to capture contribution to the cultural health of the nation.   These measures of 
external social benefit are always imperfect proxies for desired outcomes and must 
compete with the historically established legitimacy of entity-focused accounting 
measures of financial health.   Accordingly, organizations may be characterised by 
different kinds of permeability, different nuances of openness and closure, at the same 
time.    
 
These examples show how financial accounting is at the heart of an essential tension 
between the economic entity concept and the social entity concept.   Furthermore, as 
increasing numbers of large private organizations also make non-financial social 
disclosures as part of their response to pressures to be more socially responsible – to 
be discussed in the next section – the distinction between public and private becomes 
blurred across more hybrid entity concepts.  However, it would be wrong to suggest a 
convergence across public and private.  Indeed, ironically, public sector organizations 
find themselves subject to more extreme forms of economization than their privatree 
sector counterparts.   For example, UK hospitals were being constructed as economic 
entities as noted above at the same time as there was post-crisis recognition of the 
social importance of banks requiring public support because they are ‘too big to fail’.  
As Roberts (2011) puts it, the logic of market discipline has been applied in its most 
extreme form to organizations which are most remote from the market system e.g. 
hospitals and schools.  At the same time, he argues that many ‘private’ sector 
arrangements such as large infrastructure projects have been exempt from this logic of 
discipline.  Indeed, in addition to the banking system, private- public partnerships 




intended to share risk between public and private providers of services, reveal that the 
public taxpayer is usually the risk bearer of last resort.    
 
To summarise: in this section a further nuance of the society-entity tension in 
financial accounting has been explored.  While critical accounting is broadly 
committed to an accounting entity concept which lets more of more society into the 
accounting for the enterprise, this section has explored how this critical perspective is 
also turned on its head: financial accounting and other techniques have been deployed 
to keep society out and to shape organizations as economic entities in a specific sense 
i.e as more inward-looking cost-conscious economic entities seeking continuous 
improvement in efficiency first, and social purposes second.  From this point of view, 
financial accounting enables economic ideas to ‘economize’ organizations (Callon, 
1998).  Yet, society cannot be kept out so easily, and this brings us to the fourth 
problematic of financial accounting and the society-entity interface. 
 
THE RESPONSIVE ORGANIZATION: ACCOUNTING, ACTORHOOD AND 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The sense that the autonomous pure accounting entity concept is also an implicit 
actor-concept, has emerged from the discussions above, from group accounting to 
economization.  However, rather than the rationally acting, autonomous organization 
being a construction of accounting as such, the arguments of Meyer and Jepperson 
(2000) and Meyer and Bromley (2013) suggest that it is a systemic feature of 
rationalization in modern societies, of which accounting is just a case.  Modernity is 
characterised by the emergence of organizations which are increasingly attributed 




with rational, autonomous, decision-making capability and are presumed to act 
purposefully in relation to their environments.  By reproducing a distinctive form of 
culturally contingent autonomy – a bounded, responsible and acting organizational 
self, accounting is deeply implicated in this rationalization project (Samiolo, 2017). 
The accounting entity assumption is therefore not merely an enabling condition of 
possibility for organizational accounting.  It also underwrites the construction of the 
organization as actor which must increasingly respond to the demands of society and 
for which society and its representatives have expectations.   
 
Following this line of thought, the society-entity nexus can be interpreted in terms of 
the permeability of organizations to the interests of stakeholders as an actor class 
which represents society and can be defined by being entitled to demand accounts.  
From this point of view, accounting mediates and absorbs the demands of 
stakeholders.  For example, Bromley and Sharkey’s (2017) longitudinal analysis of 
US annual reports and accounts reveals the emergent character of organizational 
actorhood.  They conceptualise annual reports as contingent expressions of changing 
conceptions of such actorhood in the organizational environment, not least in 
responding to the corporate social responsibility agenda as it has unfolded in recent 
decades.   In this respect, at the same time as social entities are being constituted as 
economic actors via financial accounting as part of state reform programmes, 
seemingly economic entities are displaying forms of actorhood which speak to social 
responsibility in their annual reports and other disclosures.   
 
We should not mistake such displays of actorhood at a field level for real change 
(Young, 2017).  These displays are likely to be highly correlated with, and are 




responses to, the institutional complexity created by different logics of performance – 
economic and social – and the need to be accountable to different audiences 
(Greenwood et al., 2011).  Furthermore, powerful stakeholder groups are increasingly 
able to generate reputational risk for organizations and, in part, the growing cultural 
acceptability of social responsibility has changed the operating environment for many 
organizations.  Thus, the society-entity boundary has become one in which 
organizations as autonomous actors experience, and must respond to, reputational and 
other risks.  From this point of view the accounting entity in a world of stakeholders is 
also an entity-at- risk, permeable to demands and expectations from society and under 
continuous pressure to be responsive by making new risk and social responsibility 
disclosures.   
 
Financial accounting cannot stop the ‘outside coming in’ (Power, 2007, chapter 5); it 
is not equipped to keep risk and society entirely out.  In the core financial statements, 
societal concerns must pass a measurement hurdle to be included as costs or 
liabilities.  But these concerns can nevertheless acquire visibility in other modes of 
quantitative and qualitative accounting disclosure within the wider annual report.  
Hence, under conditions of expanded risk awareness, the boundary of the organization 
has become wider and more permeable to society than the boundary of the financial 
accounting entity (Power, 2007; Hardy & Maguire, 2016). 
 
In summary, financial accounting constitutes and is constituted by the fiction of the 
autonomous entity which is a capable and purposive actor.  We can look back at the 
technical debate about group accounting, control and consolidation methods and 
suggest that what is fundamentally at stake is sustaining, via accounting, the fiction of 




purposive control at the centre of a group, understood as an economic meta-entity.  
We should not say that these fictions are merely illusory since they are 
institutionalized and continuously reproduced.  The source of their fictiveness does 
not lie in the accounting tricks and deceptions perpetrated by firms like Enron.  It 
flows from a more general process of rationalization which is productive of ideas of 
good process, bounded entities and rational actors.  Yet once responsible actorhood is 
increasingly attributed by society to organizations, they are of necessity more 
permeable to, and at risk from, society.    
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The entity assumption is fundamental to the preparation of financial statements and 
performance reports.    It has been argued that, despite the sociology of 
embeddedness, dis-embedding is a necessary feature of accounting as a social and 
institutional process.  Furthermore, an entity concept and therefore a boundary 
between what is accounted for and what is not accounted for is a necessary condition 
for the possibility of coherent financial accounting.  Even the social entity concept 
requires a boundary to be drawn between those social effects of organizations which 
are accounted for and those which are not.  So, new forms of accounting to capture 
new objects, such as carbon emissions, require entity and boundary assumptions just 
as much as financial accounting does – but the entity may be different (Hopwood, 
2009).  All accounting requires some reduction and simplification to support its role 
in commensurating across different organizational entities (Espeland & Stevens, 
1998). 
 




It has also been argued that any specific accounting entity assumption may be 
challenged, for example by the growth of networking and outsourcing arrangements 
in which the boundaries of control and responsibility overflow accounting entities and 
their accounts.  This world of invisible relationships, radical organizational 
permeability and fluid boundaries poses continuous challenges to traditional financial 
accounting.  However, even in a world of extensive outsourcing across multiple 
organizations with critical strategic interdependencies, there are likely to be 
underlying contractual relations between distinct legal and accounting entities.  It can 
therefore be suggested that the institutional fiction of the accounting entity and the 
actor construct which it supports may be even more necessary as an underpinning to a 
world of alliances and blurred economic dependencies.   
 
Nothwithstanding the necessity of the entity concept for financial accounting, we 
began by showing that there was not one but several possible such concepts with 
somewhat different logics and implications.  In most countries, the accounting entity 
is a hybrid, mainly of proprietorial and autonomous actor logics.  The essay then 
explored four indicative problematics which exhibit the essential tensions between 
these different entity concepts, their values and the different boundaries they draw 
between the entity and not-entity.  Table 1 provides a summary of the argument. 
 
PUT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
First, taking the setting of technical group accounting and the problem of accounting 
for control, we discussed how the boundary between what is inside and outside of the 
group entity is a technical construction of accounting rules rather than a natural 




demarcation of any kind.  The group as an accounting entity conceptualises the 
outside to which it is permeable in terms of a non-controlled third-party interest.  
Second, drawing on Hines (1988) as an exemplar of critical accounting, we argued 
that the accounting entity concept implicates an ecological politics of organizational 
boundaries.  Accounting constructs and reproduces an institutionalized organizational 
reality in which some costs, such as environmental degradation, are placed outside the 
accounts and therefore outside the organization.  This means that the entity concept 
and its boundaries are a social value choice.  The critical accounting project is to 
make conventional accounting boundaries more permeable to these costs and to 
internalise them.  Third, the argument considered the inverse of this problem of 
internalising externalities in the setting of public sector organizations with public 
purposes.  Here the role of accounting has been to actively reshape organizational 
boundaries by making organizations conform to models of discrete economic and 
contractually competent autonomous entities capable of both performing and failing.  
The external benefits of these entities may be captured by metrics for impact, but the 
financial accounts construct them independently as economic entities which may be 
more or less cost-efficient.  Finally, drawing on organizational sociology, the role of 
accounting in constructing the organization as a rational actor has emerge from wider 
societal rationalization and the increased organizational salience of risk, resulting in 
organizations which must be increasingly responsive to the demands of society via 
varieties of stakeholders.  The accounting entity is permeable to these demands in 
terms of the reputational and legal risk that they pose.   
 
The arguments above are imperfect and have been stylized considerably.  The four 
settings and their problematics need much more elaboration.  For example, as noted 




above, financial accounting consists of core statements (balance sheets, income 
statements, cash flow statements) and notes to the financial statements. But there may 
also be other disclosures within the annual report, such as social impact metrics.  The 
latter may reflect more of a social entity concept than the financial statements.  
Indeed, the modern corporate annual report contains plural entity concepts and their 
forms of organizational permeability.  So the argument in this essay has greatly 
simplified the terrain of corporate reporting.  It has also not developed some possible, 
perhaps even obvious, theoretical aspects of the analysis, such as Luhmann’s systems-
theoretic perspective.  His work is no doubt directly relevant to issues of boundaries 
and permeability and could have been invoked at various junctures. 
 
However, notwithstanding these limitations, the essay has tried to show how 
accounting must be at the heart of any debate about organizational permeability.  The 
accounting entity concept, which is often invisible and untheorized, plays a critical 
role in shaping particular modes of accounting transparency and disclosure.  Financial 
accounting makes the organization permeable and auditable, but in very specific ways 
and in relation to specific values which can be contested.   The four problematics 
show how the boundary between the entity and society as ‘not-entity’ can be 
imagined in very different ways, from the technicalities of group accounting to the 
cultural myth of the organization as rational actor.  And, even in the setting of 
technical group accounting rules, society has a stake which can become suddenly 
visible.  Various socially costly frauds have involved the hiding of risk in debt 
instruments which in accounting terms are “off-balance sheet” i.e. outside the entity 
accounting system.  So the question of entities, boundaries and permeability is one in 
which accounting continuously tries to represent the organization-society relationship.   




We take this for granted most of the time and it is unproblematised.  But the inherent 
gap between organizational accounting and organizing as a process is ever present, 
and the excluded outside will continuously overflow institutionalised accountings, 
creating pressures for reform to financial accounting.  It should be clear that these 
pressures do not simply concern technical issues of measurement.  They implicate the 
essentially contestable nature of organizational entities, boundaries and permeability 
which will always be present in any new accounting form.    
 
To conclude: there is no ‘natural’ condition of organizational permeability.  We have 
not moved from a world of less permeable to more permeable organizations.  Rather, 
there is a permeability/closure nexus which is continuously changing and developing.   
Financial accounting is at the heart of this process.  It is one way, but a very important 
and institutionally powerful way, by which organizations are both open and closed, 
bounded and permeable, to their social environments.   
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Accounting entity boundary  Problematization Form of entity 
permeability 
Group – Non-Group Technical accounting and the 
problem of control 
Recognise non-controlling 
interests 
Society-entity Critical accounting and the 
recognition of externalities 
Internalization of external 
costs 
Entity-society Accounting expansion and the 
economization of social entities 
Externalization of external 
costs 





Table 1: An overview of four boundary-permeability problematics in accounting 
